1. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the Ghanaian government appealed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for financial and administrative support in receiving a mass influx of predominantly Liberian refugees. The Buduburam refugee camp, later renamed ‘refugee settlement’ by the UNHCR as part of local integration policy making (Holzer, 2015), was established in the Gomoa East District of the Central Region, 24 kilometers (15 miles) west of Ghana’s capital: Accra (Figure 1). It was jointly administered by the UNHCR and Ghana’s Interior Ministry, or the Ministry of the Interior; a department of the Ghanaian government “mandated to ensure internal security, as well as the maintenance of law and order in the country” (mint.gov.gh/). Ghanaian regulations governing refugee relations were largely settled by the Refugee Law of 1992 and the 1994 agreement championed by the UNHCR in which “Ghana [agreed] to follow UNHCR protocols in all administrative activities involving refugees” (Holzer, 2015). However, the practice of staffing the titular head of the camp (officially the ‘settlement manager’ and colloquially the ‘commandant’) with a Ghanaian government official brought regulations governing that position closer to the administration of Ghana’s Interior Ministry.
By 2006, Buduburam housed nearly 45,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2006) of the Liberian (1989-1996; 1999-2003) and Sierra Leone (1991-2001) civil wars (Figure 2), in addition to displaced persons from Nigeria and Ivory Coast (Cote d’Ivoire), and periphery populations of Ghanaian nationals. Liberian refugees in particular suffered protracted refugee crises due to “a civil war that [raged] for more than a decade and [displaced] more than half of the country’s population” (Holzer, 2015). They remained the predominant refugee population for the camp’s duration, “operating as a relatively cohesive community with extensive economic, religious, social, and political organization” (Holzer, 2013). In 2001, the UNHCR published its global refugee statistics and some three million African refugees suffered protracted refugee crises and were expected to continue as long-term refugees in increasingly worsening circumstances and conditions without any immediate recourse (Crisp, 2002).
Unlike the “expected image of a West African refugee camp [Buduburam] isn’t the typical refugee camp” (Christian Science Monitor, 2003). Buduburam became a “model” refugee camp and presented “a moderate version of a harsh form of social life” (Holzer, 2015). Displaced persons, although regularly discriminated against, “had slid into the ranks of the dispossessed alongside the […] members of the urban underclass in Ghana” (Holzer & Warren, 2015). Through the joint efforts of humanitarian actors, hosts, and refugee initiatives, Buduburam “became one of the largest and most thoroughly regulated political units in the Gomoa district” (Holzer & Warren, 2015). The Ghanaian authorities did little to restrict the economic activities or the freedom of movement of Liberian refugees, earning Buduburam “a reputation as one of the more progressive and effective refugee camps” (Holzer, 2013). Ghana acted as a surrogate in administering refugee policy and the implementation of social service programs funded by the UNHCR, an approach which is becoming increasingly popular in mediating African humanitarian crises.
By 2006, Buduburam housed nearly 45,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2006) of the Liberian (1989-1996; 1999-2003) and Sierra Leone (1991-2001) civil wars (Figure 2), in addition to displaced persons from Nigeria and Ivory Coast (Cote d’Ivoire), and periphery populations of Ghanaian nationals. Liberian refugees in particular suffered protracted refugee crises due to “a civil war that [raged] for more than a decade and [displaced] more than half of the country’s population” (Holzer, 2015). They remained the predominant refugee population for the camp’s duration, “operating as a relatively cohesive community with extensive economic, religious, social, and political organization” (Holzer, 2013). In 2001, the UNHCR published its global refugee statistics and some three million African refugees suffered protracted refugee crises and were expected to continue as long-term refugees in increasingly worsening circumstances and conditions without any immediate recourse (Crisp, 2002).
Unlike the “expected image of a West African refugee camp [Buduburam] isn’t the typical refugee camp” (Christian Science Monitor, 2003). Buduburam became a “model” refugee camp and presented “a moderate version of a harsh form of social life” (Holzer, 2015). Displaced persons, although regularly discriminated against, “had slid into the ranks of the dispossessed alongside the […] members of the urban underclass in Ghana” (Holzer & Warren, 2015). Through the joint efforts of humanitarian actors, hosts, and refugee initiatives, Buduburam “became one of the largest and most thoroughly regulated political units in the Gomoa district” (Holzer & Warren, 2015). The Ghanaian authorities did little to restrict the economic activities or the freedom of movement of Liberian refugees, earning Buduburam “a reputation as one of the more progressive and effective refugee camps” (Holzer, 2013). Ghana acted as a surrogate in administering refugee policy and the implementation of social service programs funded by the UNHCR, an approach which is becoming increasingly popular in mediating African humanitarian crises.
2. MECHANISMS OF LAW IN THE BUDUBURAM REFUGEE CAMP
Human rights are mostly commonly conceived as qua human rights (qua, as being) and must be “referenced against authoritative political bodies, typically nation-states or organizations of nation-states’ (Walters, 1996). This citizenship-based conception and implementation of human rights predominated until the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 (Figure 3). The UDHCR describes a more contemporary human rights framework that identifies “the source of rights in humanity rather than membership in a state, and it placed the responsibility to protect rights in the hands of the international community” (Sagy, 2014). It was thought that the UDHCR solved the practical and theoretical problems of human rights faced by “citizens who are discriminated against or persecuted by their own states […] the world refugee problem,” and “denizens as well as citizens” (Sagy, 2014). More recently however, the UDHR has been criticized by sociologists of human rights for presenting a “human rights discourse [that] is exclusionary in two ways: it excludes non-Western cultures and [sociopolitical minorities (e.g., women, homosexuals)]” (Sagy, 2014).
Sagy, Holzer and other sociologists of human rights have examined how human rights are actualized in protracted refugee crises like the Buduburam refugee camp. Their findings in summary being that: (1) the UNHCR’s legal practices promoted the ‘privatization of human rights,’ (2) the refugees were simultaneously engaged with and alienated from host law, and (3) the development of legal subjectivity as wards of international law (Holzer, 2013). The following discussion attempts to review of the mechanisms of law in terms of security (physical security and access to justice) observed in the Buduburam refugee camp.
Sagy, Holzer and other sociologists of human rights have examined how human rights are actualized in protracted refugee crises like the Buduburam refugee camp. Their findings in summary being that: (1) the UNHCR’s legal practices promoted the ‘privatization of human rights,’ (2) the refugees were simultaneously engaged with and alienated from host law, and (3) the development of legal subjectivity as wards of international law (Holzer, 2013). The following discussion attempts to review of the mechanisms of law in terms of security (physical security and access to justice) observed in the Buduburam refugee camp.
2.1. Privatization of human rights (to physical security and access to justice)
The Buduburam refugee camp did not notably experience “incursions from combatants in the Liberian civil war […] in part because [Ghana and Liberia] do not share a border” (Holzer, 2013). Ex-combatants were demilitarized and at least partially reintegrated. Liberian former child soldiers “expressed fear of retribution as war criminals either from fellow refugees in Ghana or the Liberian government” and many had “experienced some type of threat from a victim” or “attempts of military re-recruitment by mercenaries” of foreign wars (Woodward et al., 2009). However, there is little evidence of active combatants or armed elements within the camp, due in part to the “placement of the UNHCR regional hub in Ghana for several years [which] led to more generous resettlement programs than elsewhere in West Africa” and the renewed possibility of repatriation following the end of the Liberian civil war in 2003 (Holzer, 2013). UNHCR programs for repatriation, resettlement in developed countries, and local integration (against Ghana’s policies) would later become a point of contention among Buduburam’s refugees and perhaps the only source of disorder (host states often consider political activism to be a security threat).
Security initiatives were implemented by refugee-run organizations in part supported by the UNHCR (e.g., NWT and ADC), and Ghanaian actors (Ghana Police Service). Ghanaian authorities distrusted Liberian refugees; “refugees are often seen as a security threat to the host country [and] have constantly been branded by both the camp management and the police as security threats in the camp” (Tanle, 2013). The State of Ghana established a police station to “to provide security to the refugees and also enforce the rules and regulations” placed on refugee behavior (Tanle, 2013) and employed a total of “seven personnel for a population of 45,000 refugees” (Sagy, 2014). Ghanaian authorities were not only unable to “assume the difficult and costly responsibility for protecting the physical security of refugees,” they were also unwilling (Sagy, 2014). Police corruption was already an issue in Ghana and gained nationalist bias in Buduburam: “a common refrain among Liberians is: the police don’t serve our interests […] they speak their Twi together and come to an agreement to the detriment of the Liberian claimant” (Holzer, 2015). On the matter of the poor security, a Liberian refugee has reported that “the most painful thing is that sometimes when you call the police to come to your aid when you are in trouble, they will ask you to go and solve your own problems” (Tanle, 2013). Buduburam had become a refuge for deviant behavior due, at least in part, to the ineffective and unwilling police.
In addition to host legal institutions, the UNHCR uses ‘security packages’ – a “cluster of security measures applied to specific refugee camps” (Sagy, 2014) – to monitor security in camps: (1) Peace Education Programmes (PEP) that discouraged refugees from approaching host legal authorities, (2) claims that reporting to host legal authorities would threaten prospects of resettlement, (3) educating refugees to ‘grant human rights to one another, (4) establishment of the Neighborhood Watch Team (NWT), (5) subsequent mismanagement and disregard for refugee-run organizations (e.g., NWT and Arbitration and Discipline Committee [ADC]), and finally (6) substituting education for protection. The UNHCR recognized “the need to extend responsibility [for protecting the physical security of refugees] beyond the host state, it stressed that its own role was secondary,” although its legal practices “essentially blocked refugees’ access to justice [and transferred] the responsibility for the protection of refugees’ physical security onto the refugees themselves” (Sagy, 2014). Solutions offered by the UNHCR located the problem in the refugees themselves and not in the conflicts that created massive displacements or in their ineffective security packages. The Buduburam refugee camp was considered to be located in its host state, Ghana, but under UNHCR’s control. Sagy’s “findings from Buduburam [show] that UNHCR is reluctant to assume the difficult and costly responsibility [of] protecting the physical security of refugees,” and foists this responsibility onto the refugees in a process termed: ‘privatization of human rights’.
Security initiatives were implemented by refugee-run organizations in part supported by the UNHCR (e.g., NWT and ADC), and Ghanaian actors (Ghana Police Service). Ghanaian authorities distrusted Liberian refugees; “refugees are often seen as a security threat to the host country [and] have constantly been branded by both the camp management and the police as security threats in the camp” (Tanle, 2013). The State of Ghana established a police station to “to provide security to the refugees and also enforce the rules and regulations” placed on refugee behavior (Tanle, 2013) and employed a total of “seven personnel for a population of 45,000 refugees” (Sagy, 2014). Ghanaian authorities were not only unable to “assume the difficult and costly responsibility for protecting the physical security of refugees,” they were also unwilling (Sagy, 2014). Police corruption was already an issue in Ghana and gained nationalist bias in Buduburam: “a common refrain among Liberians is: the police don’t serve our interests […] they speak their Twi together and come to an agreement to the detriment of the Liberian claimant” (Holzer, 2015). On the matter of the poor security, a Liberian refugee has reported that “the most painful thing is that sometimes when you call the police to come to your aid when you are in trouble, they will ask you to go and solve your own problems” (Tanle, 2013). Buduburam had become a refuge for deviant behavior due, at least in part, to the ineffective and unwilling police.
In addition to host legal institutions, the UNHCR uses ‘security packages’ – a “cluster of security measures applied to specific refugee camps” (Sagy, 2014) – to monitor security in camps: (1) Peace Education Programmes (PEP) that discouraged refugees from approaching host legal authorities, (2) claims that reporting to host legal authorities would threaten prospects of resettlement, (3) educating refugees to ‘grant human rights to one another, (4) establishment of the Neighborhood Watch Team (NWT), (5) subsequent mismanagement and disregard for refugee-run organizations (e.g., NWT and Arbitration and Discipline Committee [ADC]), and finally (6) substituting education for protection. The UNHCR recognized “the need to extend responsibility [for protecting the physical security of refugees] beyond the host state, it stressed that its own role was secondary,” although its legal practices “essentially blocked refugees’ access to justice [and transferred] the responsibility for the protection of refugees’ physical security onto the refugees themselves” (Sagy, 2014). Solutions offered by the UNHCR located the problem in the refugees themselves and not in the conflicts that created massive displacements or in their ineffective security packages. The Buduburam refugee camp was considered to be located in its host state, Ghana, but under UNHCR’s control. Sagy’s “findings from Buduburam [show] that UNHCR is reluctant to assume the difficult and costly responsibility [of] protecting the physical security of refugees,” and foists this responsibility onto the refugees in a process termed: ‘privatization of human rights’.
2.2 Emergence of wards of international law
The Buduburam refugees, “unlike other disempowered populations, are encouraged to take responsibility for human rights by not claiming them from the government and solving problems on their own” (Sagy, 2014). As discussed in earlier sections, UNHCR served as the primary importer of law in Buduburam and “cultivated an understanding of refugees as legal subjects and transgressions as violations of the law” (Holzer, 2013) and human rights. The legal frame became increasingly restrictive and “the UNHCR became increasingly punitive in their response to refugee noncompliance […] a pattern of rising mistrust that [weakened] the relationships between the UNHCR and refugees” (Holzer, 2013). The legal field of Buduburam led refugees to claim international law in the Concerned Women social protests (2007-2008); “the protesters anchored their claim to rights in a special relationship to the international community” (Holzer, 2013) and expected the UHCR and international community to enforce measures for refugee protection and aid. The protests ultimately failed and were met with harsh treatment from the Ghanaian police and UNHCR: host states often consider political activism to be a security threat.